We introduce a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations which is similar to the familiar replicator dynamics for infinite populations. Our focus is on the conditions for selection favoring the invasion and/or fixation of new phenotypes. For infinite populations, there are three generic selection scenarios describing evolutionary game dynamics among two strategies. For finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios. For a fixed payoff matrix a number of these scenarios can occur for different population sizes. We discuss several examples with unexpected behavior.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we study evolutionary dynamics of a game with two strategies A and B. The payoff matrix for the game is
A B A a b B c d
Strategy A player receives payoff a when playing against another strategy A player, and payoff c when playing against a strategy B player. A strategy B player would receive payoffs b and d when playing against A and B players, respectively.
We denote by x A and x B the frequency of individuals adopting strategy A and B respectively. We have x A + x B = 1. The fitnesses of A and B players are given by
The standard model of evolutionary selection dynamics in a single, infinite, population of players is the replicator equations (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer et al., 1979; Sigmund, 1998, 2003) . In our setting, these equations take the formẋ
where φ is the average fitness of the population given by
This set of replicator equations describes a deterministic selection process, where the per capita rate of growth for each strategy is given by the difference between its fitness and the average fitness of the entire population.
Since x A + x B = 1, we see thaṫ
and
The equilibrium points are either on the boundary or in the interior. There are three generic outcomes:
(1) A dominates B. If a > c and b > d, then the entire population will eventually consist of A players. The only stable equilibrium is x A = 1. A is a strict Nash equilibrium, and therefore an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), while B is not. We use the notation A B. If a = c and b = d, then f A = f B for all frequencies. In this singular case, the two strategies are equally good. The frequency distribution does not change from one generation to the next. We call this the neutral case, and denote it by A --B.
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully applied to the study of Darwinian process of natural selection (Maynard Smith, 1982) . The deterministic model of evolutionary dynamics of a two-strategy game is well understood. Foster and Young (1990) and Fudenberg and Harris (1992) have analyzed stochastic versions of the replicator equations on a continuum population; Schreiber (2001) and Benaim et al. (2003) analyze urn processes that converge to the replicator equations over time as the population becomes infinite. However, evolution in finite groups of players has received less attention, and most of the analytic results are for variants of the best-reply dynamics [e.g., Kandori et al. (1993) , Young (1993) ]. For the Hawk-Dove game, (Fogel et al., 1997 (Fogel et al., , 1998 Ficici and Pollack, 2000) report some simulations of the 'frequency dependent roulette wheel' selection dynamic, which is equivalent to the Moran process that we analyze. Fogel et al. (1997 Fogel et al. ( , 1998 emphasize that the finite population results can be very different than the predictions of the replicator equation, while Ficici and Pollack (2000) argue that the two models make fairly similar predictions. Maynard Smith (1988) argues that in a finite population a mixed evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is more likely than genetic polymorphism in the Hawk-Dove game. Like us, Schaffer (1988) focuses on the fact that the strategy that maximizes absolution payoff need not be the one that maximizes relative payoff when the population is finite; this leads Schaffer to define and analyze a modification of ESS. It seems natural to extend our understanding to a stochastic model for finite populations. We focus on analytic results for an explicit stochastic process, as opposed to simulations or equilibrium definitions, and uncover interesting selection phenomena for finite population size that do not exist in the infinite limit.
In Section 2, we introduce a stochastic process for evolutionary game theory in finite populations. In particular, we use a Moran process with frequency dependent fitness. Maruyama and Nei (1981) , Sasaki (1989) , Takahata and Nei (1990) , Sasaki (1992) and Slatkin (2000) study the fixation probability under balancing selection in a finite population.
In Section 3, we define invasion and fixation rates, and compare them to the benchmarks set by a neutral mutant in order to quantify selection pressure. We first illustrate the population-size dependency of evolutionary games derived from the fitness difference of the two strategies. Then we state our main results on selection dynamics in finite populations. Our key result is that in finite populations, there are eight selection scenarios, as opposed to three in infinite populations.
In addition to the payoff matrix, the population size, N , plays a vital role in selection dynamics. In Section 4, we present examples to show how the selection dynamics can vary as N changes.
On the other hand, there are games where population size does not affect the selection dynamics. We give a characterization of those games in Section 5. We also show that the singular case a = c > b = d displays positive selection for B for finite population size N , but is entirely neutral for infinite population size.
We give a summary and discussion of our results in Section 6. In the Appendix , we develop the mathematical machinery for studying evolutionary game theory in finite populations, and prove our results.
A FREQUENCY DEPENDENT MORAN PROCESS
Suppose the population consists of N individuals. The number of individuals using strategy A is given by i, and the fitness of individuals using strategy A is
The number of individuals using strategy B is given by N − i, and the fitness of individuals using strategy B is given by
The selection dynamics of the game with N players can be formulated as a Moran process (Moran, 1962) with frequency dependent fitness. At each time step, an individual is chosen for reproduction proportional to its fitness. One identical offspring is being produced which replaces another randomly chosen individual. Thus the population size, N , is strictly constant. The probability of adding an A-offspring is
. At each time step, the number of A individuals can either increase by one, stay the same or fall by one. Therefore, the transition matrix of the Markov process is tri-diagonal and defines a birth-death process. The transition matrix is given by
all other entries of the transition matrix are 0.
The process has two absorbing states, i = 0 and i = N : if the population has reached either one of these states, then it will stay there forever. Let us calculate the probability to be absorbed in one or the other of these two states.
Denote by x i the probability to end up in state i = N when starting in state i. We have the recursive relation
with boundary conditions x 0 = 0 and x N = 1. The solution is given by Karlin and Taylor (1975) 
We are interested in the probability that a single A individual reaches fixation in a population of B individuals. This probability is given by
Conversely, the probability that a single B individual reaches fixation in a population of A individuals is given by
Observe that
Constant selection.
The fixation probabilities, ρ AB and ρ B A , can be compared with corresponding probabilities for constant selection and random drift. For constant selection, if A has fitness r and B has fitness 1, then for all N ,
An example for constant selection is also given by the game A B A r r B 1 1 For neutral drift, if both A and B have the same fitness, then for all N ,
An example is the game A B A 1 1 B 1 1
SELECTION DYNAMICS IN FINITE POPULATIONS
We can use the probability of fixation of neutral mutants, 1/N , as a benchmark for studying selection in finite populations. Thus, we can say that 'selection favors
Let us compare f i and g i for each i in order to evaluate whether selection acts to increase or reduce the number of A players at position i. Let 
The difference in fitness (mean payoff) between an A strategist and a B strategist,
with
where
ξ and ζ represent respectively the initial disadvantage of strategy A and that of B.
The evolutionary dynamics of the game in the infinite population is classified by the sign of ξ and ζ . In a finite population, the evolutionary outcome is based on the modified parameters ξ and ζ , such that the game is This is not just a minor modification of corresponding classification in an infinite population game (based on the signs of ξ and ζ ), but rather reveals an interesting population-size dependence in the evolutionary outcome (see Fig. 1 -as N varies, the cross-section (circle) for the four sectors of final outcomes of game dynamics moves in the ξ -ζ plane along the dotted line ξ + ζ = 0).
Suppose, for example, that ξ and ζ are in the region below the ξ -axis and above the line ξ + ζ = 0 (i.e., ζ < 0 and ξ + ζ > 0). Suppose also that a > d. Then there are two threshold population sizes for the evolutionary outcomes:
such that the A-dominant system (A is the only stable equilibrium) for sufficiently large population size (N > N 2 ) becomes bi-stable (both A and B are locally stable) The evolutionary dynamics of a two-player game in a finite population is characterized by five parameters: the payoffs and the population size N , which we denote by [a, b, c, d ] N where N ≥ 2. As is shown in (3), the condition for that evolutionary game dynamics [a, b, c, d ] N to be A-dominant (the strategy A enjoys an advantage over B for any frequency of A) is given by [a, b, c, d] 
For the minimum population N = 2, this condition is equivalent to
This has a clear meaning. The 'spiteful' strategy (b > c) enjoys an advantage if the population is small. The 'spiteful' strategy acts not only to increase its own payoff but also to decrease the payoffs of its opponents (Hamilton, 1971) . The degree of this 'spiteful' behavior increases as the population size decreases, and hence 'spite' is most evident if there are only two players. Our main results are as follows:
We will compute N 0 in the Appendix . The theorem states that for sufficiently small population size, for A to dominate B in the sense that selection favors A invading and replacing B, but not vice versa, it suffices to have b > c. Note that for infinite population size A dominates B if a > c and b > d, regardless of the relative magnitudes of b and c.
The intuitive proof of the theorem is as follows: if we consider a population of N = 2 containing one A and one B player, then the payoffs for A and B are, respectively, b and c.
We state the following results, and we will present the proofs in the Appendix.
If selection favors A invading B, but opposes B invading A, then selection must favor A replacing B and oppose B replacing A. We can say that, in this case, A dominates B. The condition 
In the limit N → ∞, we recover ξ < 0 (a < c) and ζ < 0 (d < b) as necessary and sufficient conditions for A and B to be in stable equilibrium. There are 16 combinations of these arrows between A and B, eight of which are excluded by Theorems 2-4.
Graphical notation. We use the notation
Therefore, we have altogether eight selection scenarios in finite populations. We list them as well as the corresponding scenarios in the infinite limit. 
EXAMPLES
Since the definitions of invasion and fixation criteria depend on N , we see that population size plays a key role in selection dynamics. Interestingly, for a fixed payoff matrix, we observe that several selection scenarios can occur as N increases.
We give some examples of this phenomenon.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider the payoff matrix
For infinite population size, the fitness of A is greater than the fitness of B at all frequencies. Hence, we say that A dominates B, A B. This also implies that A is a strict Nash equilibrium or evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) while B is not. For finite population size, we observe there are five cases depending on N . As N increases, A gradually gains its dominance over B. We note that a + d > b + c, so selection will not favor change for any N . Also a + b > c + d, so for large population size, selection cannot favor B.
We observe from For infinite population size, the fitness of A is greater than the fitness of B for high frequencies of A, the fitness of B is greater than the fitness of A for low frequencies of A. Hence, we say that A and B are bi-stable (the unstable equilibrium is at x A = 2/9), A ←→ B. Both strategies are strict Nash equilibria.
For finite populations, we observe four cases from Note that in this example, we see that there is a range of optimal population size N where strategy A reaches fixation better than a neutral mutant. This observation leads to novel results on the emergency of cooperation in finite populations . 
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the payoff matrix
A B A 1.9 1.1 B 2 1
For infinite population size, the fitness of A is greater than the fitness of B for low frequencies of A, but the fitness of B is greater than the fitness of A for high frequencies of A. Hence, we say that A and B are in stable equilibrium (at x A = 1/2), which also implies that neither A nor B is a strict Nash equilibrium; A →← B.
For finite populations, we observe four cases from Fig. 4 . Note that we have For infinite population size, the fitness of A is greater than the fitness of B for all frequencies. A dominates over B, A B, and A is a strict Nash equilibrium or evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) while B is not.
For finite population size, we only have two cases from Fig. 5 . We note that This example shows that spite is irrelevant in large populations, but decisive in small ones. As the population size decreases, the tendency of spitefulness increases.
For the game
A B A s 1 B s 1 we can calculate ρ AB and ρ B A precisely as in Example 5. They are
Nρ AB and Nρ B A are constant in this case. As N → ∞,
→ 1 for all i, i.e., the fitnesses of A and B are equal at all positions.
ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Example 4 leads us to the following observation. A and B have fitnesses r and 1 respectively; we see that the fixation probabilities are
We can ask for what constant fitness k will these fixation probabilities be equal to that of the game The answer depends on N . Assume s > 1. When N = 2, we see that r = 1/s. For large N , we expect r > 1 and
< 1/N , we see that 1 − 1 r < 1/N , so r < 1 + 1/N . As N → ∞, 1 < r < 1 + 1/N . Therefore, as N becomes sufficiently large, the game becomes equivalent to random drift. A and B become equally good as in the infinite case.
We have the following theorem: For generic payoff matrices, we can also find conditions on the entries of the payoff matrix so that the selection scenario does not change as N changes. 
In all these cases, A ←← ⇐⇐ B.
By symmetry, we can analyze the cases when selection favors B.
CONCLUSIONS
We have used a Moran process with frequency dependent selection to study evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations of size N . We have calculated the probability that a single individual using strategy A can take over a population consisting of N − 1 individuals using another strategy, B. If this probability is greater than 1/N then selection favors A replacing B. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for this to happen. Hence, we have characterized selection dynamics in finite populations. Interestingly for a fixed payoff matrix, describing the game between strategies A and B, the selection scenario can change as a function of population size N . There are eight such selection scenarios. In the limit of N → ∞ we always find convergence to one of the three generic selection scenarios known from the deterministic replicator dynamics.
There are many unexpected situations that can arise in finite populations. For example, in a game where A dominates B for large N , it can happen that selection favors B for small N . Similarly if both A and B are strict Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies (Maynard Smith, 1982) for the deterministic dynamics of N → ∞, selection might completely favor one strategy over the other for some finite range of N .
In a game between two strategies, A and B, deterministic selection dynamics for N → ∞ are completely characterized by the relative magnitude of the entries in each column of the payoff matrix, that is by the comparison between a and c and the comparison between b and d. For a population size of N = 2 the only relevant comparison is between b and c. All counterintuitive phenomena of finite population size dynamics, N , emerge as a consequence of this tension.
Our companion paper looks at these issues in a different but related way. That paper supposes that there is a small probability of 'mutation' from one strategy to the other, so that there are no absorbing states, and considers the limit of the long-run distribution as the probability of mutation goes to 0. In small populations, this distribution can assign probability close to 1 to a 'spiteful' but dominated strategy. The paper also characterizes the long-run distribution as the population becomes infinite, and finds that 'spite' becomes unimportant except in knife-edge cases.
In addition to explaining selection phenomena in small populations not expected from deterministic analysis, our results in this paper have interesting implications for the emergence of cooperation. Nowak et al. (2003) shows that a single cooperator using a reciprocal strategy can invade a population of defectors with a probability that corresponds to a net selection advantage.
For games with more than two strategies, the dynamics become much more complex even in the deterministic model. For example, there can be heteroclinic cycles if there are three strategies, and for more strategies, there can be limit cycles and chaos Sigmund, 1998, 2003) . As a first step toward extending our stochastic model of the frequency dependent Moran process to multi-strategy game space, we plan to study the dynamics of the rock-paper-scissors game in finite populations. It would also be interesting to find conditions on the payoff matrix of an n-strategy game where a dominant strategy would emerge in finite populations. We plan to pursue these questions in our future work.
APPENDIX

Proof of Theorem
For selection to favor A for all N < N 0 , we want
A similar proposition holds in the case b < c.
We now prove our main results. To make the argument and analysis more transparent, we will first make a change of basis. Instead of working with the payoff matrix 
Let M = N − 2 and define
(3) α 0 < 1 and α M > 1: since α 0 = b/d and α M = a/c, we have ad > bc. By Lemma A1, the sequence α i is monotone increasing, i.e.,
k is the unique integer where
We see that β(x) is a convex function that starts at α M > 1, and concaves
γ (x) is a convex function that starts at 1/α 0 > 1, and concaves down to
Looking at the β(x) and γ (x), and the integrals 
